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 ‘We are facing the fight of our lives. The trade union movement 
will be judged on how effectively we meet this challenge’ 
(AMWU National Secretary, Doug Cameron, May 2005). 
Howard’s planned industrial relations (IR) legislation confronts 
Australian unions with their worst nightmare. This is obviously the case 
for rank and file members who face a savage attack on their conditions, 
but the legislation is also terrifying for the union bureaucracy. Since 
Federation, Australian capitalism has operated on the basis of mediating 
class conflict at the workplace through arbitration and conciliation. This 
did not mean that class conflict was absent, or that the arbitration system 
was not itself a weapon in this conflict, only that at the base of any such 
conflict was a recognition by employers and the state of the legitimacy of 
the union bureaucracy in the industrial relations process. With its 
WorkChoices legislation, the Howard government has signalled an 
onslaught on this entire system and, with it, the central role of union 
officials in the system of structured class relationships.  
The purpose of this article is to provide a critical assessment of the 
strategy drawn up by the ACTU to resist WorkChoices. Although there 
are differences of emphasis within their ranks, the ACTU executive and 
office bearers have pursued a strategy with five main components. First, 
to convince employers that they are wrong to break from the system that 
has served them well for a century. Second, to lobby the ALP at state and 
federal levels. Third, to lobby government politicians and those of the 
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minor parties. Fourth, to raise community awareness of the issues at 
stake. And, finally, to mobilise the rank and file membership of the 
unions. In what follows I explain briefly each of these components 
before analysing their effectiveness as a strategy to defeat the 
Government’s industrial offensive. 
ACTU strategy 
(i) Appeal to Business 
The ACTU approach to business was spelled out by ACTU Secretary 
Greg Combet in a speech to the National Press Club on 6 July 2005. The 
problem with the Howard agenda, Combet argued, is that it is a ‘radical’, 
‘reckless’, ‘irresponsible’ and ‘biased’ plan that will not address ‘the real 
economic priorities facing Australia’. Productivity needs to be boosted, 
Combet explained, but the IR system is not the problem. Indeed, the 
current IR system is delivering all that business needs. The real problem 
for business is inadequate investment in infrastructure, skills, and 
research and development, resulting in ‘slow growth in high value 
exports, under-performance in the generation of highly skilled jobs, and 
sluggish productivity in the tradeable goods sector’ (Combet, 2005). The 
ACTU Secretary contrasted what was needed with the ‘ideological’ 
approach of the Howard government: 
Simply put, Australia needs an investment-led reform agenda 
focussed on the supply side of the economy. That is what will 
produce the next productivity revolution. Instead, John Howard is 
offering the realisation of a long-held IR prejudice. His is a 
backward-looking agenda to cut labour costs, to find our 
economic way in the world by preying on the weak and 
vulnerable, by attacking fairness and democratic principles 
(Combet, 2005).  
The notion that Howard’s plan was simply the product of an outdated 
and counterproductive ideology was a repeated refrain of both the union 
bureaucracy and the ALP during the course of the campaign. The unions, 
in concert with a future ALP government, offered Australian capitalism 
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the prospects of a fresh surge of productivity that the Howard 
government could promise but not deliver. The ACTU leadership used 
the experience of the Accord years in the 1980s as evidence that its 
strategy was superior to that of the Coalition. ACTU President Sharan 
Burrow explained in response to the suggestion by an interviewer that 
unions were holding back productivity: 
Oh look, you know, we were the architects – with the employers I 
might say – in a more conciliatory and consensual environment 
led by a Labor government, of the skilling environment, the 
multiskilling environment, that actually drove productivity.... 
We’re actually absolutely committed to growing the economy 
and growing productivity, but let’s do it on the basis of skill, of 
economic growth through increased industry investment, through 
infrastructure development, through new industries (interview, 
ABC radio, PM show, 30 June 2005). 
The task for employers, together with the unions and ALP, was to defeat 
the right-wing ideologues who had seized control of the government 
agenda (Combet, 2005). The problem was that: ‘[Workplace Relations 
Minister] Andrews has been listening too much to the urgers in big 
business like the Business Council’s Hugh Morgan, and right wing legal 
crusaders at Freehills’. ‘Small and medium size businesses’, however, 
Combet continued, ‘are not interested in the ideological preoccupations 
of big business lobbyists. They want certainty about their legal rights and 
obligations’ (Combet, 2005). And it was the ACTU and ALP that could 
offer them this certainty. 
(ii) Lobbying the ALP 
The second component of union strategy was to look to the ALP at state 
and federal levels for support. At state level, labour councils maintained 
pressure on state Labor governments to take legal action in the High 
Court to prevent the federal takeover of the state system of arbitration.  
At federal level, the ACTU leadership urged the ALP parliamentary 
caucus to take a stand against the legislation and, within the ranks of the 
unions, campaigned for a return to Labor in federal office in 2007. Thus, 
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Labor leaders were to be found on the platform of most large rallies 
during the course of 2005 and were promoted as the union movement’s 
great hope for ultimately defanging the legislation. The ACTU 
consistently sought to highlight Labor’s opposition to the WorkChoices 
legislation, putting it in the most positive light. Thus, during his Press 
Club speech in July, Combet urged full support for the party’s leader:  
You can see already that the stance that Kim Beazley has taken in 
relation to these changes is not only a solid one and a strong one 
and a committed one and one driven by values, one driven by a 
commitment to fairness, but it’s also a stance that I think will put 
Labor in good stead politically (Combet, 2005). 
The problem for the ACTU, however, was that Labor too was seeking to 
keep business happy. And, unlike the union bureaucracy, its future did 
not necessarily rest on sustaining union organisation. Thus, following the 
defeat of Latham in the aftermath of the 2004 federal election, the party 
leadership under Beazley dropped its pledge to abolish AWAs, 
promising to support them if they did not undercut award conditions 
(Lewis, 2005).  
(iii) Lobbying Members of the Government and Minor Parties 
The third element of ACTU strategy was to urge members ‘to contact 
John Howard and Liberal and National party members to tell them not to 
use their power in the Senate after 1 July in ways that may benefit big 
business but hurt the majority of working families’ (ACTU, 2005). 
Liberal and National members were urged by Sharan Burrow ‘not to 
toady to John Howard but to stand in defence of their workers in their 
constituencies if they want to be re-elected’ (interview, ABC radio, PM 
Show, 30 June 2005). The ACTU campaign, Greg Combet argued in his 
Press Club speech, was ‘designed to make the government think again’. 
Buttressing the appeal to the consciences and political survival instincts 
of Liberal and National politicians was a more focused lobbying effort 
concentrated on National Party Senator Barnaby Joyce and Family First 
Senator Steven Fielding who were deemed by the ACTU leaders to be 
most likely to switch votes on the legislation. 
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(iv) Build Support in the Wider Community 
Perhaps the most notable initiative in building support for the union 
campaign in the wider community was the launch of a series of very 
effective television advertisements in May. Run over several weeks on 
all the main channels, these advertisements significantly raised the 
awareness of the wider community, both union and non-union, to the 
threat posed by WorkChoices and contributed to the major mobilisations 
that occurred later in the year (below). The advertisements were not, 
however, the only tactic used in community outreach. Organisers and 
officials in many state branches leafleted football matches and other 
community functions and events. Union barbeques and touch football 
matches were organised in parks and public spaces. Banners were hung 
off union buildings in areas of high public exposure, and dozens of media 
events were staged. 
(v) Mobilisation of Members 
In terms of mobilising members in industrial action, the immediate 
response by the ACTU to the Howard government’s re-election was to 
avoid a fight. Following an emergency meeting of the ACTU executive 
on 18 October 2004, President Sharan Burrow declared that ‘At this 
point in time, we don’t have any plans to actually respond to the prime 
minister’s agenda with industrial activity’. In place of such plans was a 
commitment to ‘connecting to the community’ and encouraging stronger 
groups of unionists to ‘firewall’ their conditions by negotiating three-
year enterprise agreements (Norington, 2004; Skulley, 2004). On 23 
November, Combet again had nothing to say about any industrial action 
at a meeting of union delegates in Melbourne. A similar lack of any plans 
for action was forthcoming from the leaders of the NSW and Victorian 
labour councils over the summer. 
In February and March 2005, the situation began to turn around. 
Meetings of delegates from the CFMEU (construction union) (23 
February), Victorian Trades Hall Council (VTHC) (24 February), the 
AMWU (manufacturing workers union) (16 March), and the National 
Union of Workers (18 March) passed resolutions demanding action. On 
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23 March, a VTHC meeting of 1,500-2,000 delegates voted to support a 
national day of protest with street marches, and called on interstate 
labour councils to follow their lead (Davis and Norington, 2005).  
On 12 April, the executive of Unions WA met to consider a proposal for 
a mass rally in May ‘leading to a carefully planned Statewide program of 
industrial action to stop work across WA’ (Jerrard, Drummond and 
MacDonald, 2005). On the following day, the AMWU National Council 
voted in favour of a national stoppage and protest on 30 June. On 4 May, 
1,000 workers and supporters attended a rally in Adelaide organised by 
the CFMEU and AMWU (Richmond, 2005). On the same day 5,000 
building workers walked off the job in Melbourne (Bull, 2005). On 19 
May, the Queensland Council of Unions came out for a state day of 
protest on 30 June. On 1 June, the National Tertiary Education Union 
also held a national protest against associated plans by the Higher 
Education Minister to make further university funding conditional on the 
offering of AWAs in the university system. Of all the major labour 
councils, Unions NSW was the slowest to move, but mass meetings of 
delegates were eventually convened in Sydney and Parramatta on 27 
May.  
All of these steps occurred without any ACTU endorsement. On 6 April, 
the ACTU National Campaigns Committee announced that it would run 
a national week of action from 27 June to July 3. However, no call was 
put out by the ACTU for a united day of action involving industrial 
action or protest marches. It was left to the local labour councils and 
individual unions to organise for such events.  
Despite ACTU inaction, the national week of action and, in particular, 
the mass rallies on 30 June and 1 July, were a major success. The march 
of 120,000 in Melbourne on 30 June was the largest action, but 20,000 
rallied in both Brisbane and Perth, 10,000 in Geelong, 5,000 in Adelaide, 
and 3,000 in Hobart. In NSW, 80,000 attended meetings across the state 
on 1 July, led by 10,000 at the Sydney Town Hall on 1 July, followed by 
a march of 20,000. A further 6,000 marched in Wollongong. Many 
thousands attended protest events outside the major cities. All up, 
something like 270,000 took some form of action on these two days, 
many of whom were breaking the law by stopping work to attend.  
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The result of this mobilisation was immediate and profound. Unions 
were inundated with new members in June and July. The NSW Nurses 
Association signed up 1,000 new members, and the NSW branch of the 
Australian Services Union 273. The ACTU call centre reported a 400 per 
cent increase in phone calls, and there was a 100 per cent increase in 
inquiries at the Victorian branch of the National Union of Workers (The 
Age, Good Weekend magazine, 20 August 2005). The mobilisation also 
impacted on the broader political landscape. In the days following the 
rallies, Coalition support, on a two party preferred basis, fell from 51 per 
cent to 46 per cent in AC Nielsen polling.  
The demonstrations and rallies on 30 June/ 1 July were not just an 
expression of opposition to the current round of attacks but drew from 
years of hostility to successive waves of government ‘reforms’. The fact 
that so many workers took part also gives an indication of the underlying 
resilience of the union movement despite years of decline. It also 
indicates how much more could be achieved if the ACTU mobilised to 
win.  
Most importantly, the success of 30 June/ 1 July gave heart to union 
activists everywhere and emboldened the bureaucracy, leading after a 
short delay to the calling of a national day of action four months later, on 
15 November. Serious union resources were devoted to building this day 
of action, with the result that attendances were higher than on 30 June/ 1 
July. In total, more than half a million unionists and supporters took part, 
with 250,000 protesting in Melbourne alone, 50,000 in Sydney, 40,000 in 
Adelaide, 30,000 in Perth, 25,000 in Brisbane, and 6,000 in Hobart. 
Outside the rallies in the capital cities, hundreds of rallies and meetings 
were held in towns across all regions and in every state. 
Analysis of the ACTU Campaign 
Despite the impressive mass mobilisations, there are a series of 
shortcomings with the ACTU strategy to defeat WorkChoices. First, there 
is no indication that employers are susceptible to the union bureaucracy’s 
arguments that it can be a reliable partner in the task of managing 
Australian capitalism. Indeed, every major employer group has publicly 
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sided with the Howard government’s attacks. The reason why they hold 
fast is not because they have been duped into subscribing to an 
antediluvian and counterproductive ideology but because late capitalism 
demands a continued offensive against the Australian working class. 
The Australian economy is now entering its 14th year of growth, the 
longest sustained period of economic expansion for many decades. 
However, underlying problems in Australia’s recent run of economic 
success still remain (Bramble, 2004). The Australian capitalist class is 
therefore enjoying its record profits, but the long-term tendency to 
stagnation in the Western economies is never far from its thoughts. Big 
business in Australia lacks the confidence in the economic system that its 
predecessors exhibited in the 1950s and 1960s. This is why Qantas, 
Telstra, GMH and the Commonwealth Bank continue to cut staff even 
while making large profits. Business is driven onwards, knowing that it 
cannot slacken the pace - ‘Accumulate, accumulate, that is Moses and the 
prophets’, as Marx wrote in Capital. Such accumulation means 
continuing attacks on the working class. The Howard government is 
committed to accelerating the process started by the Hawke Labor 
government in the mid-1980s, with the Prime Minister claiming that ‘the 
job of economic reform is never finished’ (Norington, 2005a). In this, the 
government is firmly supported by the Reserve Bank (Norington, 2005b) 
and by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which 
regard Australia as a showcase for neoliberalism (International Monetary 
Fund, 2005: 18; World Bank, 2005). 
In this neoliberal scheme, there is no place for trade unionism and, short 
of a return to vigorous industrial campaigning by the unions, no place for 
trade union leaders. In their quest to boost corporate profits and reassert 
employer prerogatives, the employers have been joined by the Prime 
Minister and successive workplace relations ministers, most obviously on 
the waterfront and in construction, but also in the public sector, where, 
for example, department heads and university vice chancellors have been 
given riding instructions to squeeze the unions out.  
Australia’s union leaders are faced with the stark reality that they need 
the employers, but the employers only need them if they have something 
to offer, specifically the ability to deliver a stable and disciplined 
working class. The lack of any fighting leadership from the ACTU since 
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the early 1980s has given the capitalist class the opportunity to win 
labour discipline by coercive means – legislative attacks, individual 
contracts, the creation of a large peripheral labour force, the fear of 
unemployment – and employers now sense that they can use the 
opportunity to marginalise trade union leaders. Thus, while not denying 
that the personal antipathy of the Prime Minister and senior ministers 
towards trade unionism is a factor underlying WorkChoices, the material 
factors are far more significant – the competitive challenge demands it 
and the consistent failure of the union leaders to resist the employer 
offensive makes it feasible in a way that was not the case during the 
heyday of the ‘New Right’ in the mid-1980s (Plowman, 1987; Sheldon 
and Thornthwaite, 1999). 
Furthermore, the union leaders’ analysis of the economic situation is 
based upon a false counter-position – the ‘low-road’ approach of wage 
cuts and union-busting as against the ‘high-road’ approach of 
infrastructure investment, R&D and skill development. Australia’s 
employers are quite capable of arriving at high productivity returns by 
means of coercion. Taken together, these factors explain the immunity of 
business leaders to the entreaties of the union leaders that they can be 
joint partners in a productivity revolution. 
The universal support of business leaders for the Howard legislation also 
explains the futility of appeals to conservative politicians from the Prime 
Minister down. Despite the slide in polling for the government in July 
through November, and despite some minor tinkering with the legislation 
following pressure from some Coalition parliamentarians, the Prime 
Minister is pressing ahead with WorkChoices with the enthusiastic 
support of most of his colleagues. He had no alternative, for to have 
rejected it, in the absence of a massive union industrial campaign 
threatening the profits of big business, would have represented a 
politically unsustainable back-down by the government and the revival of 
concerns in employer circles that the government had lost its ‘reform 
appetite’.  
Similar problems are evident with the appeals to the ALP at state and 
federal level. Over the past decade, the High Court has been re-made in 
Howard’s image and now has a solid conservative majority. It is 
unlikely, therefore, that the High Court will rule against the legislation to 
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any significant degree. Regardless of this tactical assessment, however, 
there is the issue of the commitment that the state Labor leaders have for 
a difficult fight. The Victorian Premier promised at the 15 November 
rally in Melbourne that his Government would fight the new laws ‘every 
step of the way’ and yet has taken no steps in his six years in office to 
reinstitute the Victorian system of industrial awards that was abolished in 
1996 by the Kennett Government. His colleague in South Australia, 
Mike Rann, promised at the Adelaide rally to ‘stand alongside the trade 
union movement in fighting this legislation’ but on the previous day had 
written to the Federal Treasurer urging the Commonwealth Government 
to publish a scorecard ‘demonstrating to the world, and to business, 
where governments need to lift their game in the charge to get rid of red 
tape’ (Richardson, 2005), barely disguised code for further economic 
deregulation. A High Court challenge will probably eventuate, but it is 
likely to drag on with little useful effect for workers.  
Very little hope can be placed in federal Labor either. Industrial relations 
has become a major positive factor in Labor’s opinion polling through 
2005 and this has given the Federal opposition an incentive to ride this 
issue through to the next election. Whereas Mark Latham barely even 
mentioned the word ‘union’ in his year as Opposition leader, federal 
Labor has now made a major turn towards the language of class. In 
October, Kim Beazley announced that Labor would ‘rip up’ the 
WorkChoices legislation when it took power and would put in place ‘a 
fair system of conciliation and arbitration’ whose basic structure, 
however, was not elaborated upon.  
Nonetheless, despite these commitments, the Labor leader is hamstrung 
by his simultaneous desire to appeal to employers as a viable alternative 
to the Coalition in the matter of economic reform (Uren, 2005). Federal 
Labor’s shift to the right during the course of 2005 on uranium mining, 
civil liberties and the ‘War on Terror’, voluntary student unionism, tax 
cuts for high income earners, and land rights in Northern Territory, is 
indicative of the general trajectory of Labor policy. Even in the area of 
industrial relations, the promise to ‘rip up’ WorkChoices has left silent 
Labor’s continuing commitment to AWAs, an inconsistency which 
reflects the dual pressures operating on the ALP. If the GST experience 
at the 2001 federal campaign is any guide, it is possible that earlier 
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promises to ‘roll back’ Coalition legislation will themselves be rolled 
back in due course, particularly in the event that business launches a 
fierce campaign against the threat of repeal of WorkChoices in the course 
of an election campaign. 
The success of building support and raising awareness in the community 
about the damage done by WorkChoices has already been noted. In two 
separate opinion polls in July and September, more than 60 per cent of 
those surveyed opposed the legislation. But, ultimately, the question 
remains: with what purpose and to what effect? Awareness and support 
have to be harnessed to a specific strategy to give them any force. And 
the ACTU strategy in this respect is ultimately one of electoralism – vote 
Labor in 2007. ‘Winning support in the community’ is simply code for 
this strategy and thus is subject to all of the problems outlined above . 
Ultimately, the only thing that can save the union bureaucracy, and 
indeed working class conditions, is a union campaign of mass industrial 
action. The problem is that the most powerful weapon in the workers’ 
hands, the strike, occupies at best a marginal role in the ACTU 
campaign. As is the case with social democracy more generally, union 
leaders face the problem that the methods that can actually defeat an 
aggressive attack on their position are also those that threaten their 
position from another direction. Union leaders have to mobilise union 
members by outlining the threat that the legislation poses to their 
conditions but also to convince business that they have a strategy that can 
secure continuing profitability for Australian capitalism. A strategy to 
actively frustrate the passage of the legislation and, subsequently, to 
make it inoperable, would be one based on mass industrial action of the 
type that defeated the penal powers of 1969. While such a mass 
campaign certainly cannot be ruled out in 2006, it clearly runs against 
attempts by the union bureaucracy to convince employers of its bona 
fides as a negotiating partner, as well as representing a major break with 
the entire character of union strategy since the early 1980s. The 
sensitivity of the union leaders in this respect is indicated by the apology 
to ‘good employers’ issued by the ACTU president, Sharan Burrow, for 
any disruption associated with the 15 November rallies (Anon, 2005).  
As with the case of the ALP, the rhetoric of the union leaders shifted to 
the left in the latter half of 2005, with the ACTU Secretary indicating in 
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November that he would not pay any fine and would be prepared to go to 
jail in defiance of the legislation. However, this is at best essentially a 
defensive posture focused on the preparedness of individuals to act on 
behalf of the union movement, not the kind of collective strike action that 
is needed, one which would involve taking active steps to shut down key 
industries to force business to retreat. 
Would such a strategy of mass action be feasible? Critics of the ACTU 
strategy have raised the example of Clarrie O’Shea, leader of the 
Victorian Tramways Union, who was jailed in 1969 for refusing to pay 
fines. Mass strikes in Victoria, NSW and Queensland resulted in the 
immediate release of O’Shea and the subsequent repeal of the penal 
powers by the Coalition government. The leadership response where this 
argument has been made is essentially defeatist – union membership is 
much lower than in 1969 and union delegate structures have been 
weakened, rendering a repeat of this action impossible.  
Leaving aside the question of why the ACTU has been incapable of 
reversing union decline over two decades, the argument is not 
convincing. Indeed, a mass campaign, involving for example, the 
shutting down of key ports, railways, or the supply of electrical power to 
industry is more likely to be successful now than in 1969 for several 
reasons. First, opinion polls reveal widespread awareness of and public 
opposition to the WorkChoices legislation and much greater sympathy 
for trade unions than was the case in the late 1960s. Second, for this 
reason, the Howard government is on the defensive. Third, there has 
been a stream of union mass mobilisations, involving demonstrations and 
on occasion strikes, in the past decade, most obviously in Victoria and 
WA. The Melbourne demonstration of 80,000 unionists in support of the 
Maritime Union in May 1998 was but one example of this. The June and 
November demonstrations in 2005, the largest national mobilisations of 
union members and supporters in Australian history, confirm that there is 
a mass sentiment to act if a lead is given by the leaders of the labour 
movement.  
Years of neglect have left base structures of the union movement in a 
fragile state. This means that there is no cohered layer of union activists 
who have a capacity to organise in the absence of an official lead. In that 
sense only the situation is worse than in 1969. However, what is clearly 
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better is the preparedness of workers to act when called upon to do so by 
their union leaders. Given the evident failure of the union leaders to 
mobilise systematically through the course of 2005, with the more than 
four month hiatus between the two national days of action and no 
specific action proposed to follow up on the success of the 15 November 
mobilisation, the absence of such a cohered layer who could drive the 
campaign forward is the very obvious negative in the overall political 
situation facing the Australian working class.  
Getting the IR laws up is one thing. Implementing them is another. 
Australian industrial relations may be heading back to the late 19th 
century, a time of intense class polarisation. Whether or not this leads to 
an active fight-back on the part of unions is a further question and 
depends on the preparedness to fight both amongst the rank and file 
membership and the leadership. What we have seen in the course of 2005 
demonstrates that there is a will amongst workers to fight but also no 
capacity to organise when the leaders are not prepared to move. 
Overcoming this impasse and defeating this legislation requires the 
rebuilding of a genuine left in the Australian workers’ movement, one 
that is not beholden to alliances with business and the parliamentary 
ALP. 
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